China’s rise has been accompanied by a substantial expansion of its global footprint and influence. Many observers view China’s global influence as rapidly growing, even surpassing that of the U.S. overall. However, in this blog, we offer a more nuanced perspective by analyzing data across various domains, specifically indicators of economic, strategic, and diplomatic influence.
While China is undeniably a rising global power, with significant influence in trade and certain regions, our analysis reveals that it lags behind the U.S. in several critical areas, particularly in global strategic and diplomatic influence. Here are two key takeaways:
China Pulls Ahead of the U.S. in Trade While Falling Behind in Strategic and Global Development Areas.
China Lags in Post-COVID Diplomacy on the World Stage.
China’s dominance in trade is striking. We present a map of gross trade difference below, which measures the difference in countries’ trade (the sum of export and import) with China relative to their trade with the U.S. Greater trade with China is denoted in red while greater trade with the U.S. is denoted in blue.
In most countries in Africa and Asia, China outpaces the U.S. in trade. In Latin America, there is no winner across the board, and the only region the U.S. leads in trade is western Europe. Even Australia, a country which entered the trilateral security pact AUKUS to hedge against China , traded substantially more with China than with the U.S.
Since 2016, China’s influence via trade is augmented by its surging outward foreign investment (OFDI) in manufacturing and information technology (IT). In Figure 2, we plot the cumulative stock of Chinese OFDI in several sectors. Where infrastructure and mining used to make up the bulk of Chinese outward investment, China has clearly pivoted since the mid-2010s so its OFDI has more recently focused on overseas manufacturing and IT. The stock of Chinese OFDI in these key sectors has accumulated to $400 billion as of 2021. Today, that figure likely is substantially higher.
These figures do not capture the full story. Through SOEs and a more centralized economy, the Chinese state operates as a unified buyer and seller, capable of mobilizing trade under political directives. In other words, China’s system allows for substantial market manipulation. The 2010 Japanese rare earth dispute shows that China’s centralized system gives the country incredible leverage in high demand markets where Chinese firms control supply. China’s recent export controls on antimony is another textbook case for its ability to exert economic influence.
Beyond minerals, China’s BRI-related goals emphasize becoming a major partner for less developed countries. Much of the discourse surrounding China’s efforts to build up partnerships with developing countries suggests that the U.S. influence is waning in the Global South. However, measured by both the official development assistance (ODA) and arms sales to the Global South, the U.S. far outweighs China.
As we can see from Figure 3 (select country and then press the play button at the bottom to look at countries receiving Chinese and U.S. ODA overtime), China is focused on building partnerships in certain regions via foreign aid, whereas the U.S. aid flows to many more countries in need of aid.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4, Chinese development assistance, where present, is more often than not substantially lower than U.S. assistance.
Given that both the U.S. and China have highly developed defense industries, the balance of military arms sales is a crucial metric in assessing which country holds greater relevance as a strategic partner. Arms sales data from 2017 to 2023 shows that, while China is a regional arms exporter, particularly to South Asia (e.g. Bangladesh and Pakistan) and Africa, the U.S. remains dominant globally (Figure 5: select country and then press the play button at the bottom to look at U.S. and Chinese arms sales figures overtime).
Moreover, in recent years, U.S. arms sales remain widespread and arms exports to its largest customers have grown. In contrast, Chinese arms sales remain limited geographically and their amount has stayed stagnant, as shown in Figure 5. This maybe because China’s international security cooperation is primarily for a different purpose: regime security for the partner countries — as seen through expansion of police cooperation and sales of internet surveillance and facial recognition technology in addition to weapons, as opposed to military alliances or international security partnerships.
Alex Li, Doctoral Student of Political Science, University of Oregon. Class of 2024, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
Harris Doshay, Assistant Director of Research and Writing, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
Weiyi Shi, Nonresident Scholar, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
Young Yang, Research Data Analyst, China Data Lab at the 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy