Since May 2019, the China Data Lab at the 21 st Century China Center has conducted sixteen online surveys in China, each of which targeted approximately 1,000 urban respondents, the latest of which was conducted December 2023 through January 2024. These surveys, under the project China From the Ground Up (CFGU) , have employed a quota sampling strategy whereby we recruited respondents according to pre-specified proportions of gender, education, age groups, and geographical locations. Over time, we have built a dataset utilizing repeated questions asked to different waves of survey respondents, allowing us to show trends in Chinese public opinion since 2019.
In this blog, we will draw on multiple CFGU surveys to guide you through some of the critical shifts and continuities in the Chinese views since 2019. Below are four takeaways on the drops, spikes and trends in China from our unique dataset on public opinion in China.
Our data can help capture significant sudden changes in China’s socio-economic conditions. Taking as an example what happened to people during the height of zero-COVID in 2022, our data shows that during this wave, the proportion of respondents who were employed had taken a noticeable dive. Simultaneously, the share of respondents whose income failed to cover their expenses peaked. Combined, these two findings suggest that the Chinese government’s draconian Zero-COVID policy took a noticeable toll on people’s economic well-being, a result that could have contributed to public unrest toward the end of 2022.
Recent economic headwinds appear to have hit youth in our sample the hardest. Reported employment has consistently been lower for younger people in our sample. The dip in September 2022 appears to have been caused in part by the coordinated decline in employment for both under- and over-24 respondents in our sample, and appears to have rebounded in our latest wave in December 2023.
In spite of the outburst of unrest in 2022, the Chinese public generally expresses strong support for the existing political system. Our surveys asked respondents to rate their level of agreement with a set of statements related to the Chinese political system. Chinese respondents show a robust preference for the Chinese political system over other systems.
As Figure 2.1 indicates, they are generally proud of their political system, with the average level of pride almost always exceeding 4 out of 5. On average, Chinese respondents also agree with the statement that “In the long run, our political system can resolve the problems facing our country.” Finally, respondents generally consider the country to be on the right path of reform.
While all of these indicators remain high at scores of around four out of five, they have all declined slightly (~.2 points) from their late-2021 early-2022 peaks in the latest waves, during the same period where employment was also on the decline.
Clearly, responses to the aforementioned set of regime-related statements suggest a high level of support for the PRC political system. However, the average Chinese respondent did acknowledge that China’s political system is not necessarily the best in the world. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, when asked to assess the statement “There exists a more advanced political system in the world,” the average Chinese respondent tended to select “neither agree nor disagree” or “somewhat agree.”
CFGU has repeatedly asked respondents to rate their level of trust in China’s central and local authorities on a feeling thermometer. After rescaling, a value of 0 indicates strong distrust, while a value of 10 indicates strong trust. Figure 3 indicates that, overall, respondents have a great deal of faith in the Chinese government. Our data also shows that, consistent with the conventional wisdom, public trust in local government generally trails behind that in the central government. However, trust in the central government declined to its lowest recorded level (.709) during the height of COVID Zero in 2022 while local governments took less of an initial hit.
According to Pew Research, the proportion of Chinese holding favorable views of the U.S. reached as high as 58% in 2010, and it never dipped below 40% between 2010 and 2016. Those times appear to be behind us. The Chinese public’s fluctuating views of the U.S. reached a nadir under Trump and stayed low since COVID.
Our surveys measure attitudes towards major countries on a scale of 0 to 10 or 1 to 10, with the lowest values indicating strong dislike and 10 indicating a strong affinity. Figure 4 clearly shows that ever since we started the survey in 2019, Chinese public perceptions of the U.S. have consistently not been positive, hovering at or below the neutral line, which suggests that respondents’ feelings towards the U.S. are mostly in the “neutral” to “dislike” portion of the scale, lower by a large margin than their feelings toward Russia.
In 22020, a significant gap even opened between the Chinese feelings toward the U.S. and toward Japan, the PRC’s historical nemesis. Chinese feelings toward the U.S. did not recover under Biden until late 2022 when it rebounded to be closer to the pre-pandemic levels, although not quite reaching the already lower favorability levels of the pre-pandemic Trump presidency.
With sixteen waves of surveys under our belt, China from the Ground Up can now provide useful insight into trends in Chinese public opinion over time, in addition to its valuable work in taking snapshots of particular issues at a given moment. As you can see, COVID and its (mis)management seems to have wrought serious consequences for the CCP’s political legitimacy. However, Chinese citizens are highly skeptical of the U.S. and its system of government as well. While the future of both of these trends is uncertain, CFGU will continue to serve as a valuable resource for scholars of Chinese public opinion to chart new trends as they emerge.
Yanchuan Liu, Political Science Ph.D. Student, UC San Diego
Lei Guang, So Family Executive Director, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
Harris Doshay, Assistant Director of Research and Writing, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
Young Yang, Research Data Analyst, China Data Lab at the 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy
This blog is based on the result of the recurring survey questions of the China From the Ground Up project. See project page for project description and methodological notes.
The data is available for download here .